Recall systems undermine representative democracy, in which citizens choose elected representatives to take decisions on their behalf. Accountability is ensured by regular elections, but in between these citizens should trust their representatives to exercise their judgement responsibly. Many policies may require unpopular short-term pain (in the form of higher taxes, spending cuts, new laws that restrict personal behaviour, etc), in order to achieve a longer-term benefit. For these reasons it is natural for voters to suffer “buyers’ remorse” but dangerous to allow them to act on it – politicians constantly looking over their shoulders in fear of recall petitions will never dare to undertake necessary but painful reforms. We should only judge representatives on their overall record after several years in power.

Recall procedures can be very easily abused. In marginal seats they can just be a way for sore losers to try to overturn a valid election result, leading to permanent campaigning at the expense of good government. Powerful private interests, such as rich lobby groups or media magnates can use their influence to attack politicians they dislike, promoting recall petitions to advance their own agendas. Even where there is genuine popular feeling against a representative, the minority who dislike him or her are likely to be more highly motivated than those who don’t object to his/her behaviour in office, which will distort any process based on obtaining signatures or turning out for a one-off vote without national implications.

As well as being unnecessary and dangerous, recall elections are also expensive. Holding a special vote means taxpayers’ money has to be spent on preparing the ballots, hiring halls, taking public employees away from their other duties, sending out information, etc. – the 2003 California vote cost $50 million. And the very possibility of recall elections also requires a state permanently to maintain a larger electoral authority than would otherwise be necessary. In addition politicians will have to maintain permanent campaign funds in case they are challenged in a recall petition, leading them to spend time on unnecessary fund-raising rather than serving the public.

The overwhelming number of elected representatives at every level already keep the concerns of their constituents constantly in mind, working very long hours in their interest. Recall systems are offensive as they imply that all politicians are crooks who need some kind of parole procedure. In addition, too much focus on very local interests can make politics very parochial and lead to too little consideration of the overall national interest, allowing small minorities to block necessary reforms and encouraging wasteful “pork barrel” spending. That is why the policy platforms and whipping systems of national political parties are a necessary part of democracy that should not be undermined by the constant fear of local recall initiatives. Finally, recall elections are not the only means to hold politicians to high standards of behaviour; if they stray ethically they can already be punished by the courts, by impeachment, or by legislative ethics panels.

Those who argue for recall systems say it is about getting rid of corrupt or incompetent politicians. In reality, most recall votes in systems where they are allowed come down to judgements about policy decisions. In 2003 no one accused Gray Davis of being personally corrupt or mentally incapable of wielding power. Davis was ejected as Governor of California because voters didn’t like the way he had handled power-utilities and tried to solve the state’s debt problems. Not only should Davis have been allowed to serve out his term so that voters could judge him on the long-term success of his policies in these areas; the struggles of his successor as Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, with much the same set of problems suggest that getting rid of Davis did little to address the underlying problems facing California.

Recall mechanisms can lead to perverse outcomes. In most systems the incumbent has to gain over 50% of the votes in order to survive in office, but there is no such barrier to the election of a replacement. Thus a representative can be sacked for only gaining 45-50% of votes in a recall election, while his successor might win office with only 30% or less of the votes in a multi-candidate battle to replace him. And any mechanisms that try to overcome this problem will either mean the incumbent is so heavily favoured that the whole exercise is pointless, or will take so long that good governance will inevitably suffer.